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MEANS OF EQUITABLE PROTECTION AGAINST TORTS
By WmLIAM Q. DE Fu -
Where equity prevents a threatened wrong or injury or
proceeds to repair an injury, it accomplishes this by the writ of
injunction.' Injunction is an order or process issuing from the
court addressed to the defendant, commanding him to abstain
from doing, or commanding him to perform, a certain act. It
may be, therefore, either preventive or remedial in its operation
and, consequenily, injunctions are divided into two great classes,
prohibitory injunctions and mandatory injunctions.2 Prohibi-
tory injunctions are those requiring the defendant to abstain
from doing a certain act or from pursuing a certain line of con-
duct. These constitute by far the larger part of injunctions
granted by courts of equity Mandatory injunctions are those
which require the defendant to do some act.
Injunctions are also subject to division pursuant to another
plan of classification. One kind is the preliminary or interlocu-
tory injunction, the other is the final, permanent or perpetual
injunction. This division has reference simply to the stage of the
case when the injunction is issued and to its duration, not to its
character otherwise.3
Injunctions are frequently issued upon the filing of the
suit or soon after and before the cause has been heard and de-
cided upon the merits. Such injunctions are the preliminary or
interlocutory injunctions. They continue until further order of
the court. They are always within the control and discretion of
* LL.B., University of Virginia, LL.M., University of San Fran-
cisco; Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. Author,
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
COMMUNITY PROPERTY.
'Acknowledgment is made to MERWIN. PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
(1895), pp. 424-428, for much of the discussion relating to the kinds
and nature of injunctions.
Statutes frequently define and make provision for injunctions
at some length. However, the use of injunctions is inherent In equityjurisdictibn and any court upon which general equity jurisdiction
has been conferred by constitution or statute has full power to issue
injunctions. Certainly where full equity jurisdiction is conferred by
constitutional provision, no legislative act could limit the court with
respect to this inherent power. Consider In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526,
34 Pac. 227, 21 L.R.A. 755, 37 Am. St. Rep. 78 (1893)3Preliminary or interlocutory injunction may be mandatory in
form. Keys v. Allgood, 178 N.C. 16, 100 S.E. 113 (1919).
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the court and may, upon proper motion and proper cause shown
at any time during the progress of the cause, be modified or dis-
solved. If the final. decision upon the merits is m favor of the
defendant, then as a matter of course such injunctions are dis-
solved. If the final decision on the merits is in favor of the plain-
tiff, then such injunctions are usually made final or permanent.4
A strong prima facie case should be shown to justify inter-
position by an equity court by an injunction before the rights
of the parties have been determined by a full trial. The justice
of the preliminary or interlocutory injunction lies in keeping
everything in status quo until those rights can be determined.
Where the act, condition or situation complained against by the
plaintiff may cause great damage if not halted or suspended
pending the trial on the merits, a final decision on the merits in
the plaintiff's favor will be of little or doubtful value.5
Final, permanent or perpetual injunctions are those whiclh
are ordered after a final hearing of the cause upon its merits,
when the decision is in favor of the plaintiff. Such an injunc-
tion constitutes a part of the final decree of judgment.6 With
the usual decree of judgment, unless the court reserves some
right or power to modify it, or to set it aside, it passes from the
control of the court and can be modified or set aside only upon
a rehearing or review of the cause. But a final injunction em-
bodied within a decree or judgment presents a different situa-
tion. It is uniformly recogmzed that the court may dissolve or
modify the final or permanent injunction where changes- in
circumstances or conditions warrant it.7 Frequently, the injunc-
tive decree provides an opportunity for the defendant to remove
4 Temporary restraining order distinguished from interlocutory
injunction, see Wetzstem v. Boston, etc., Min. Co., 25 Mont. 135, 63
Pac. 1043 (1901).5 See, especially, Harriman v Northern Securities Co., 132 Fed.
464, 475 (1904).
Contents of decree granting temporary injunction, see, e.g.,
Local 309, etc., C.I.O. v Gates, 75 F Supp. 620 (1948).
'Necessity of definiteness of terms of injunction, see Collins v.
Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, 76 Atl. 24, 19 Ann. Cas. 991 (1910)
Santa Rita Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 112 Mont. 359,
116 P 2d 1012, 136 A.L.R. 757 (1941), Ladner v Siegel, 298 Pa. 487,
148 Atl. 699, 68 A.L.R. 1172 (1930)
See annotations, Power to modify permanent injunction, 68
A.L.R. 1180, 136 A.L.R. 765.
Situation is same in federal courts. See 13 CYc. FED. PROC., 2d cd.,
Sec. 6597.
L. J. 3
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the cause of the injury and its permanence depends upon
whether or not he accomplishes such removals
ENFORCEMENT OF INJUNCTION-CONTEMPT
Equity in accomplishing its purposes and affording relief
to the complainant acts upon the person of the defendant. It
lays its command upon the defendant personally to desist or to
act. 9 The injunction represents the formal expression of this
demand and defines the extent or the limits of what the de-
fendant must or must not do.10 If the defendant fails or refuses
to obey the injunctive decree or process of the court, he is in
contempt of court." The court may proceed against him to pun-
ish him for such contempt. The contempt is that which is desig-
nated as civil contempt, as distinguished from crimnal con-
tempt.' 2 While the proceeding to punish for civil contempt may
involve the idea of retribution for defying the court and setting
at iaught the judicial processes of orderly government, its pri-
mary purpose is to compel the defendant to obey the order or
decree of the court and thus obtain for the plaintiff the relief to
which the court has adjudged him entitled. Accordingly, it is
not usually a separate proceeding but is merely part of the
case in which it arose.' 3
The punishment imposed for contempt may be either by
fine 14 or imprisonment' 5 or both.' 6 The defendant can remove
ISee, e.g., Payne v Johnson, 20 Wash. 2d 24, 145 P 2d 552
(1944)
IIt is customary to direct the injunction not only to the person
of the defendant but also to his agents, employees, assignees, etc.,
Berger v Superior Court, 175 Cal. 719, 167 Pac. 143, 15 A.L.R. 373
(1918). See also Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65 (d).
"Necessity of definiteness of terms of injunction, see Collins v
Wayne Iron Works, supra n. 6.
' Sufficincy of notice or knowledge of order, see Cape May &
S. L. R. Co. v Johnson, 35 N. J. Eq. 422 (1882).
" Discusson of civil and criminal contempt, see Parker v. United
States, 153 F 2d 66, 163 A.L.R. 379 (1946).
"N right to trial by jury, see Walton Lunch Co. v Kearney,
236 Mass. 310, 128 N.E. 429 (1920)
"Fine as for benefit of injured plaintiff, see Montgomery, Fines
for Contempt as Indemnity to Party to Action, 16 MINx. L. REV. 791
(1932). Proof of damages by plaintiff to enable court to determine
amount of fine, see Root v McDonald, 260 Mass. 344, 157 N.E. 684,
54 A.L.R. 1422 (1927)
"Legislation limiting extent of imprisonment for contempt con-
formed with by court as furnishing useful yardstick and so long as
such legislation does not infringe upon constitutional power of court
to punish by contempt. In re Shortridge, supra note 2. See also Nelles,
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himself from further contempt of court by obeying the court's
order. It may be mentioned, incidentally, that the defendant can
purge himself of contempt by showing that it is impossible for
him to carry out the order, where this inability has not resulted
from his own fault and where his conduct has not been willful or
contumacious.' 7
It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to call to the court's at-
tention the fact that the defendant has failed or refused to obey,
whereupon notice or process is served upon him, as in other legal
proceedings. If he is not so served, there is no jurisdiction m the
court to proceed against him for contempt.' 8 Is it possible, then,
for the,. defendant to escape carrying out the court's command
and the punishment therefor, by removing himself from the
court's jurisdiction so as not to be reached by service of such
notice or process? If he is a nonresident of the state, he may
successfully accomplish this design, if one discounts the practi-
cal aspects which may Involve the necessity of leaving business or
property interests unattended. These practical aspects are even
more apparent in the case of a foreign corporation doing busi-
ness in the state. But if he is a domiciliary of the state and
leaves the state, by the usual conflict of laws rule he may be
served with notice or process by publication or the like, since
a domiciliary even though temporarily absent from the state
remains subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of his state.' 9
Contempt proceedings, accordingly, could be instituted and an
adjudication of guilt be entered and a.fine imposed.which could,
The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 COL. L. REv. 956
(1931).
"Violation of injunction and pumshment therefor in federal
courts, see 13 Cyc. FED. Paoc., 2d ed., Secs. 6652-6663.
7 Andrews v. McMahan, 43 N.M. 87, 85 P 2d 743, 120 A.L.R. 697
(1938), and annotation at p. 703.
" See Parker v. United States, supra note 12.
"While domicile serves as a basis for jurisdiction so that per-
sonal service within state may be dispensed with, the substitute that
is most likely to reach the defendant is reqired in order to accom-
plish substantial justice. McDonald v Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 37 Stp. Ct.
343, 61 LW.d. 608, L.R.A. 1917F 458 (1917).
California is an exception to the foregoing rule, in that personal
service within the state is required to give jurisdiction even in the
case of a domiciliary. See De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, 112
Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345, 53 Am. St. Rep. 165, 32 L.R.A. 82 (1896).
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b. enforced by seizures of the domieiliary's property in the
state.
20
ANTICIPATORY MEASURES
.May the court, at the outset or during the pendeuey of the
suit, seek to anticipate and prevent the possibility of disobedi-
ence of any commands it may lay upon the defendant? It is said
that there are no principles of equity to support the sequestra-
tion or impounding of assets of property of the defendant to se-
cure obedience to such future commands as may be laid upon
him. Whether statutory authorization permitting such action
exists must usually be sought m the attachment statutes and
these are usually limited in scope to contract actions. for a
specific sum of money and are inapplicable to suits seeking
equitable relief even though as an incident thereof a sum of
money is sought.21
Nevertheless. an anticipatory preventive measure of per-
haps limited application has existed in equity m the form of
the so-called writ of ne exeat. Such a writ might be issued upon
the commencement of the suit for equitable relief, during the
pendency of the suit, or upon issuance of the final decree, to
secure its enforcement. But such writ related primarily to the
person of the defendant and issued only upon satisfactory proof
that he planned or intended to remove himself beyond the
court's jurisdiction so that he might escape obedience to such
command as might be or had been laid upon him. The writ has
frequently been termed an equitable bail. It involves taking and
keeping the defendant in custody until he gives bail or bond in
a designated amount, conditioned upon his keeping himself
amenable to the enforcive processes of the court. Its use seems
to have been confined to equitable suits relating to a demand
based upon an equitable debt or pecuniary claim and to suits to
preserve property and jurisdiction over it.
'Blackmer v United States, 284 U.S. 421, 52 Sup. Ct. 252, 76
L.Ed. 375 (1932), where District of Columbia court issued order to
show cause why United States citizen then in France should not be
adjudged guilty of contempt in refusing to obey subpoena of the
court and there was held to be suitable notice of such order and
adequate opportunity to appear and be heard. The imposition of a
fine to be satisfied by seizure and sale of his property was valid and
proper.I See Note, 31 VA. L. REV. 946 (1945), to De Veers Consol. Mines
v United States, 324 U.S. 212, 65 Sup. Ct. 1130, 89 L.Ed. (1945).
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In the first named use, the result has been that in many
jurisdictioias it has been termed a form of imprisonment for debt
so as to fall within the general abolition of imprisonment for
debt. But other jurisdictions have considered it not an imprison-
ment for debt and so not within any abolition of imprisonment
for debt. 22 Whether or not it has been abolished in a particular
jurisdiction, statutory equivalents are frequently found which
authorize the court to require security from the defendant that
he will carry out the order or decree of the court. 23
While the writ is directed at the person of the defendant as
a means of preventing him from removing himself from the
court's jurisdiction and control, it has also been used, by the
control over the person, as a means of preventing the removal of
property It will be seen that removal of his property by the
defendant would permit him to prevent its application to pay-
ment of the equitable debt or pecuniary claim, where that is the
subject of the suit, or to remove it from the court's control
where its preservation is involved. 24
The writ of ne exeat may frequently be a more effective
means of seeing that the court's command is carried out because
it permits preventive measures to be taken before the disobedi-
ence actually occurs. Otherwise, it is necessary to wait until the
disobedience occurs and then proceed by way of contempt. To
wait until a wrongful act is done is not consistent with the cus-
tomarv principles of equity 25
PRACTICABILITY OF ENFORCEMENT OF INJUNCTION
It may well happen that an equity court has jurisdiction
of the defendant to enter an injunction against him but the cir
cumstances are such as to make it impracticable for the court to
see to its eiiforcement. This may result from the fact that the
defendant may easily remove himself from the control of the
See Ne Exeat, 38 Am. Jur. 617; annotation, 118 Am. St. Rep.
988.
Use of writ in federal courts, see 13 Cyc. Fed. Proc., 2d ed., Secs.
6701-6706.
See de Funiak, Is Writ of Ne Exeat No Longer Available in
Californza, 18 CAL. ST. BAR. JOUR. 110 (1943).
2 See Ne Exeat, 38 Am. Jur. 619.
Requiring applicant for injunction to give security is frequently
provided for by statute and, of course, should be distinguished.
See Caughron v. Stinesprmg, 132 Tenn. 636, 179 S.W 152,
L.R.A. 1916C 403 (1915), and annotation at p. 407.
-: See de Furnak, 18 CAL. ST. BAR. JOUR. 110 (1943)
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court or. that the acts necessary to be done by him must be done
beyond or without the court's jurisdiction where it cannot en-
force or-supervise a proper performance. Or it may be that the
-nature of the acts necessary to be done is such that the court has
not the capacity or means of, supervising them or determining
that they are properly performed, even though performance
would be carried out within the court's jurisdiction. Where the
court has the theoretical power to grant an injunction but en-
forcement is impracticable or impossible, the court will not
grant the injunction. It would be derogatory of the dignity of
the court to enter orders it could not enforce.2 6
Where the defendant is doing an act outside the state which
is injuring property of the plaintiff within the state, the court
must necessarily order the defendant to do or refrain from doing
-acts outside the state where the court is without authority 2 7
Where it is also clear that the defendant can easily remove him-
self from the court's control or will not remain subject to its
control, enjoining him would probably be a useless act. But if,
as is usually the case, the defendant will continue to be subject
to the court's control, the court is thereby in a position to see
that he gives obedience to its command, even though the acts of
obedience must be performed beyond the court's jurisdiction.28
If the defendant is a citizen of the state, or is a nonresident or a
foreign corporation doing business in the state, it may safely be
assumed that the defendant is not in a position to remove him-
"See also WALSH, TREATISE ON EQUITY (1930), Sec. 18.
The situation should be distinguished in which not only is the
in3urious act being done outside the state but the property injured
is also outside the state. In this situation, some courts have, not
hesitated to act, on the ground that the parties were before it and
amenable to its process, as in Alexander v Tolleston Club, 110 MI1. 65
(1884). Other courts have declined to act in such situation on the
ground that the cause of action was local in nature and could only
be brought where the property was, as in Ophir Silver Min., etc.,
Co. v Superior Court, 147 Cal. 467, 82 Pac. 70, 3 Ann. Cas. 340
(1905)
'See The Salton Sea Cases, 172 Fed. 792 (1909) noted 23
HARv. L. REv. 390 (1910) Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Twin Falls,
etc., Co., 245 Fed. 9 (1917) noted 31 HARV. L. REV. 646 (1918), 27
YALE L. J. 946 (1918)
A case frequently cited to the'contrary is Port Royal R. Co. v.
Hammond, 58 Ga. 523 (1877).-There the defendant who would have
to be ordered to do acts in another state was a corporation incorpo-
rated n :Goorgia and, under the view of corporations at that time,
had nolegal existence beyond the state of its incorporation so as to
be able to do an act in another state.
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self or itself from the court's control without loss, and probably
severe loss.
A situation similar to the foregoing is that in which a
domiciliary of the state is ordered to discontinue prosecution of
litigation which he has commenced in another state, because it
imposes undue hardship and pecuniary loss to the defendant in
such litigation to be sued there instead of in the state where the
injunction is now sought by him. The expediency of granting
such injunction rests largely in the court's ability to control the
defendant and coerce him. 29
"See, e.g., Reed's Adm'x v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 182 Ky. 455,
206 S.W 794 (1918), Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N.J.Eq. 94, 43 Ati. 97(1899), id., 63 N.J.Eq. 783, 53 Ati. 625 (1902).
